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Abstract
One issue that is concerning to the web security community is the correct identification of the
origins of advance fee fraud mails. This has serious implications for directing concerted efforts
towards mitigating the malaise in the right direction. Although previous research (Cuckier et al,
2007, Gbenga, 2007; Igwe, 2007; Progame, 2007) opined that these mails originate mainly from
Nigeria and other West African Countries, research is warranted using available tracking tools
to validate previously held notions about the issue of advance fee e-fraud mails. We harvested in
real-time aggregated advance fraud e-mails over a two year period using the sinkhole
aggregation methodology as proposed by Abhinav et al (2008), Using freeware e-mail and
internet protocol address tracers, we obtained results that deviates from the generally held
believes about the origins of advance fee fraud e-mails. Our findings have implications for
research on spam filtering and by extension web security.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally believed that most fraudulent mails in cyberspace and phishing attacks originate from or are
traceable to Nigeria and some other countries in the West African coast. In addition to these are the
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emergence and prevalence of phishing scams using social engineering tactics to obtain online access
codes such as credit card numbers, bank account details, social security number, ATM pin numbers and
other personal information. A new dimension in the problem domain is the evolution of dating sites
purportedly seeking to connect eligible bachelors to spinsters as well as sites for obnoxious activities such
as sites dedicated to married people looking for fun and sexual escapades outside the borders of their
marriage. These genre of web-based fraudulent activities coupled with the ubiquitous nature of the
internet continue to make the issue of ethics and safety topical and worrisome among internet users all
over the world. Although the use of rich narrative in these mails appeals to strong emotions and invokes
archetypal myths of windfall fortunes that get victims to fall for these scams (Cuckier et al, 2007)
scientific research is warranted to validate these assumptions in the light of new and emerging
technologies such as e-mail address and IP address tracers that allow users track the origin of fraudulent
e-mails.

2. RELATED WORKS
Technically, efforts at controlling and mitigating cyber crime have concentrated on the development of
filters and anti-phishing software such as E-Mail address Encryptors, the use of an outbound filtering
systems as a measure to stem the volumes of spam mail at their origin and the use of support vector
machines (SVMs) and Bayesian systems to train spam filters (Longe and Chiemeke, 2006; Peter, 2006;
Tony, 2009; Longe et al, 2008). In his thesis, Tenfa (2006) posited that advance fee fraud is a global
problem that requires a global solution. Holt and Graves (2007) carried out a qualitative analysis of
advance fee fraud email Schemes and opined that the problem is escalating in size and dimension. Olowu
(2009) called for an Inclusive framework for Africa after examining the cyber crime problem in the light
of national boundaries, the sovereignty of the laws of nations and boundaries of domestic legal responses.
Oriola (2005) evaluated Nigeria’s Regulatory Response to advance fee fraud and found them inadequate.
Reich (2004) discussed advance fee schemes across borders and traced the origins to Nigeria and some
West African Countries. Russell (2001) proposed an agenda for the reformation of laws and policies to
deal with advance fee fraud. Profgame (2007) present poverty as a driving force for cyber crime in
Nigeria. Ampratwum (2009) showed the link between crime rate and development and posited that there
is a need for transnational collaborative efforts in combating these crimes. Ribadu (2007) present a nexus
view of the cyber crime problem and called for collaboration between law enforcement agencies across
the world to join hands in militating against the cyber crime problem. Gbenga (2007) address the causes
and effects of the menace of Cyber Crime in Nigeria and proposed youth empowerment in terms of
employment and financial aid as tenable solutions.

3. EMERGING TRENDS
Information provided by the United States Internet Crime Complaint Centre (USIC3, 2009) between 2006
and 2008 (Tables 2 and 3) brings the advance fee fraud mail issue to the fore as Nigeria maintained a high
position among the first ten nations as the origin of Spam mails. Confidence fraud, computer fraud, check
fraud, and the 419 mail round out the top seven categories of complaints referred to law enforcement
during the year. Of those complaints reporting a dollar loss, the highest median losses were found among
check fraud ($3,000), confidence fraud ($2,000), Nigerian letter fraud (West African, 419, Advance Fee)
($1,650). Diplomatic missions around the world warn visitors to various West African countries such as
Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Benin Republic of susceptibility to 419
scams. Countries outside of West Africa with 419 warnings are South Africa, Spain, and The
Netherlands.
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Table 1: Amount Lost by Selected Fraud Type for Reported Monetary Loss
Complaint Type

% of Reported Total Dollar
Loss

Average (median) $ Loss per
Complaint

Nigerian Letter Fraud
Check Fraud
Investment Fraud
Confidence Fraud
Auction Fraud
Non-delivery

1.7%
11.1%
4.0%
4.5%
33.0%
28.1%

$5,100.00
$3,744.00
$2,694.99
$2400.00
$602.50
$585.00

Credit/debit Card Fraud

3.6%

$427.50

Source: Internet Crime Complaint Centre Report (2006-2008) - http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx

The effect of fraudulent spamming activities can be measured by the pressure volumes of spam messages
places on internet bandwidth, thus slowing it down. This is not helpful in an age when subscribers are
clamouring for faster connections. It also increases the dial-up costs by extending the time a person
spends reviewing e-mail. When Spammers use false e-mail addresses and users attempt to respond to
them, the e-mail bounces around in cyberspace loops creating huge administrative loads for Internet
infrastructures. Other hidden costs involve the claims made on two precious human resources: time and
energy. Computer users can spend hours attempting to identify the original sender of an e-mail. Research
has shown that out of the estimated 30 million e-mail messages each day, about 30% on average are
unsolicited commercial and fraudulent e-mails (Deborah, 2005). Chiemeke & Longe (2008) projected
that spamming will cost 1.4 percent of employee productivity, or N131,100 per year per employee in
Nigeria, the equivalence of $874 in the US. Filtering Spam is therefore an extremely urgent problem.
With the escalation in the volume of spam mails on the webscape, organizations are also being subject to
mounting pressure to deal with issues regarding employee productivity, morale, sexual harassment and
congestion of the e-mail infrastructure.

Table 2: Top Ten Countries - Perpetrator of Cybercrime
Year 2006

Year 2007

Year 2008

60.9%
15.9%

United States

63.2%

United States

66.1%

United Kingdom

15.3%

United Kingdom

10.5%

5.9%
5.6%

Italy

1.6%
1.2%

Nigeria
Canada
Romania
Italy

5.7%
5.6%
1.5%
1.3%

Nigeria
Canada
China
South Africa

7.5%
3.1%
1.6%
0.7%

Netherlands

1.2%

Spain

0.9%

Ghana

0.6%

Russia
Germany
South Africa

1.1%
0.7%
0.6%

South Africa
Russia

0.9%
0.8%

Spain
Italy

0.6%
0.5%

Ghana

0.7%

Romania

0.5%

United States
United
Kingdom
Nigeria
Canada
Romania

Source: Internet Crime Complaint Centre Report (2006-2008) - http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreports.aspx

4. RESULTS
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In Table 2 the ICC report for the period 2006-2008 reflects that the United States tops the list of
nations that perpetuates cyber crime (62% - 66.1% in three years). This is followed by the United
Kingdom where cybercrime activities by percentage dropped from 15.9% to 10.5% between
2006 and 2008. Nigeria is third on the list with a marginal increase of 1.6% between 2006 and
2008. Two other African countries ; Ghana and South Africa are also listed in the midst of other
European and Asian nations. What the above Table did not reflect is that typology of these
cybercrimes. Even though the United States is consistently ahead of other nations in terms of
cyber criminal activities as reflected in the table, the diversity of cyber criminal activities
responsible for the figure include advertisement spam, cyber pornography, product marketing
bulk mails and so on. However, a focus on cyber fraud in Table 1 show that monetary loss due
to advance fee fraud tops the list of reported dollar loss to cyber criminal activities. This
unfortunate scenario begs the questions – are these loses traceable to mails that emanate from
Nigeria and other West African Countries?

4.1 IMPLICATIONS
Against the backdrop of Advance fee fraud mails, it is feasible to ask the question: ‘Why do
they continue to exist and where do they come from?’ The answer to this is simply that no matter
how strange a concept it may seem, Spammers get results. A small percentage of email users
actually do fall for the bogus financial proposals in Advance Fee Fraud or 419 mails – named
after this section of the Nigerian Financial Crime Code. While the public perception of Spam is
largely negative, Spammers would not be operating if it were not a viable source of income. They
only needs to receive one hundred responses out of ten million Spam messages (0.001%
acceptance) to turn a profit. Within the last decade, the use of the Internet in Africa has grown
so rapidly with the explosion of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet cyber cafés and
access points. This has had several positive impacts on the social, economic and educational
sectors in these nations. Unfortunately, the image of nations such as Nigeria, Ghana and
Cameroon has also suffered as a result of the nefarious activities of some users, who instead of
utilizing the Internet for constructive purposes, turn it into a cheap channel for the
perpetration of criminal activities, especially the ‘Advanced Fee Fraud (AFF). Nigeria in
particular has therefore gained recognition as a source of fraudulent Spam mails characterized by
bogus business proposals and fraudulent joint ventures.
If these mails do not entirely emanate from the suspected nations , then spammers have scored
another point by allowing efforts to be directed and focused solely on a few nations in Africa that
only contribute a small percentage to the advance fee fraud problem. Since most of these nations
don’t even have reliable databases for apprehended cyber criminals, these criminals can simply
change location, move to other nations even in the western world and perpetuate their heinous
crimes. The increase in the volume of cyber criminal activities noticed in the United States, Canada
and part of Europe may be a consequence of these scenario. Are spammers migrating to the
western world from resource-poor regions of the worls; sub-saharan Africa in particular - The
implications for cyber security and information systems research is that measures must be adopted
that correctly identify causation, locate criminals in order to direct preventive efforts in the right
direction and provide appropriate treatments. This is what we set out to do in this research.
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5. EXPERIMENTS
We adopted but modified the sinkhole methodology in real-time as proposed by Abhinav et al (2008).
Our e-mail accounts were activated and used from locations outside Nigeria, specifically in the United
States of America and United Kingdom and Canada to ascertain the source of these mails. Subscription
to all forms of online promotion and marketing were avoided in order to avoid other forms of spam. We
received over 36,000 fraud spam mails over a two year period.

Tracking Sources of 419 E-Mails
We selected 400 electronic mails randomly from our corpus of spam mails harvested over time.
To find the actual location from which the e-mail originates we pick the “Received From” IP that
is at the bottom of the list on the header view. We run the e-mails through specific open-source
e-mail and IP address tracers such as IPSLocator, E-Mail Trace, and IPGeolocator. We obtained
the result show in the table and figures below.

Table 3: Advance Fee Fraud E-mail Distribution by Continents
Country

Percentage of 400 Mails

AMERICA AND CANADA

28.5

EUROPE

23.2

AFRICA

20.4

SOUTH AMERICA

15.2

ASIA

9.5

AUSTRALIA

4.2

For a letter purportedly originating from Kuala Lumpur claiming that there is a lottery Jackpot
that has been won, the trace showed that the letter emanated from Brazil South America.
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Fig. 1: Screenshot of e-mail purportedly from Kuala Lumpur

Fig. 2: E-Mail trace result for the email showing it originates from Brazil
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The analysis of an e-mail claiming to originate from Interswitch Nigeria Limited with the
message “an account has been suspended and personal details should be provided for
reactivation” provided the following analysis

Fig. 3: Letter Purportedly from Interswitch Nigeria Limited

IP

Country

Country

Address

(Short)

(Full)

160.36.0.84

US

UNITED STATES

TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

160.36.0.84

US

UNITED STATES

TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

160.36.0.84

US

UNITED STATES

TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

Flag

Region

City

ISP

Map

Fig. 4: Result from IP2Location on the validity of the IP address

Table 4: Different forms of e-mail harvested from our experimental e-mail accounts.

Type

Spamming Technique Employed

Bayesian
Poisoning

E-mail with links to other websites with an e-mail
body filled with meaningless sentences to confuse the
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Spoofing/phishing
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Bayesian filters using tokens manipulations i.e
AgeiNg numbe3rs etc.
E-mail in response to dating site activities asking for
funds transfer, pictures or photographs of the recipient
etc.
Fictitious sender addresses usually direct users to
respond to an entirely different address(es) from the
sender address. Usually, the two addresses looks
similar. i.e
akinadekolapo444@yahoo.com
kolapoakinade444@yahoo.com
For conference Invitation – variations in the from email address and the required e-mail address for
communication
These e-mails contain just an attachment or two with
no contents at all.
Electronic mail targeted at individuals with concrete
correct information purportedly asking for funds
transfers to a friend(s) in trouble or stranded
somewhere far abroad

22%

17%

13%

9%
4%

6. DISCUSSIONS
From the Table above, one very disturbing trend in the spam war is the emergence of
individually targeted e-mails and academic conference(invitation) spam e-mails. Quite a number
of individuals have fallen victims to this genre of spam. The fraudsters use key-loggers and acess
to privileged information on individual such as travel itineraries to target unsuspecting victims.
Findings from our experiment also showed that advance fee fraud e-mails do not only emanate
from Nigeria and some West African nations, a bulk of them are beginning to originate from the
western world (America and Europe) the middle east and part of Asia. This is concerning as it
reflects the fact that a focus on Africa or West Africa in particular as the major source of
fraudulent mailing and cyber activities as is the norm is misleading. This fact is exacerbated by
the emergence and prevalence in the middle east of cyber criminal activities, portending grave
dangers for other part of the world that are already apprehensive on the fear of cyber terrorism. It
remains to be investigated if the increase noticeable in the volume of fraudulent spamming
activities emanating from other part of the world is correlated with the number or volumes of
Africans, Asians and other immigrants’ moving into the western nations.
As the internet expands, opportunities for unethical use will continue to increase if nothing
pragmatic is done in terms of policies, technology and law to protect users against online
criminals. This is reflected in the routine activity theory which posited that crime can be
motivated by opportunities provided in routine activities. Incidentally, the use of the web falls
perfectly into the domain of routine activities hobeit on a global scale. (Cohen et al, 1979; Felson
& Cohen, 1993). Correlating poverty with cyber crime as a major factor that points to Africa
and some resource-poor environment as the source of advance fee fraud mail may not capture the
©AJIS 2011
The African Journal of Information Systems, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2011

24

Longe & Osofisan

On the Origins of Advance Fee Fraud emails

entire picture and could be misleading. Future research will explore the contributions of other
subtle but extraneous factors such as the economic meltdown and immigration policies on the
increase in fraudulent cyber activities now noticeable in the western world.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Citing the example of the increase in the wave of crime after World War II despite the booming
economy and expansion of the Welfare states Cohen & Felson (1993) argued in support of the
routine activity theory that the prosperity of contemporary society offers so much opportunities
of crime since there is much more to steal. The premise of our argument is that most cyber
crimes go unreported to law enforcement agencies and may not be necessarily be influenced by
social factors such as poverty, inequality and unemployment (Longe, 2008b). Research and
policy will have to focus on identification, causation and treatment to be able to combat the
cyber crime menace.
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